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Abstract
A probability distribution is regular if it does not assign probability zero to
any possible event. While some hold that probabilities should always be
regular, three counter-arguments have been posed based on examples where,
if regularity holds, then perfectly similar events must have different probabil-
ities. Howson (2017) and Benci et al. (2018) have raised technical objections
to these symmetry arguments, but we see here that their objections fail.
Howson says that Williamson’s (2007) Bisomorphic^ events are not in fact
isomorphic, but Howson is speaking of set-theoretic representations of events
in a probability model. While those sets are not isomorphic, Williamson’s
physical events are, in the relevant sense. Benci et al. claim that all three
arguments rest on a conflation of different models, but they do not. They are
founded on the premise that similar events should have the same probability
in the same model, or in one case, on the assumption that a single rotation-
invariant distribution is possible. Having failed to refute the symmetry argu-
ments on such technical grounds, one could deny their implicit premises,
which is a heavy cost, or adopt varying degrees of instrumentalism or
pluralism about regularity, but that would not serve the project of accurately
modelling chances.
Keywords Regular probability . Hyperreal probability . Infinitesimal probability . Non-
Archimedean probability . NAP theory . Numerosity . Objective chance . Space-time
invariance
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1 Introduction
Many philosophers have suggested that probabilities (rational credences, objec-
tive chances, or both) should be regular (Carnap 1950, 1963; Kemeny 1955,
1963; Shimony 1955; Jeffreys 1961; Edwards et al. 1963; De Finetti 1964;
Stalnaker 1970; Lewis 1980, 1983; Skyrms 1980; Appiah 1985; Jackson 1987;
Jeffrey 1992; Wenmackers and Horsten 2013; Benci et al. 2013, 2018;
Hofweber 2014).1 A probability measure is regular if it does not assign
probability zero to any possible event. For a probability space 〈Ω, F, P〉, this
is represented by the condition that if P(A) = 0 then A is the empty set.
Such a probability measure can be difficult to arrange, especially where the set of
possible outcomes is infinite and all outcomes are equally likely, for then the regular,
non-zero probabilities of these outcomes will normally add up to more than one. But
we can avoid this problem if we allow P to take infinitesimal values. If we assign a non-
zero infinitesimal probability to each outcome in our sample space, these need not add
up to more than one.2 The desideratum of regularity has been the main reason for
introducing infinitesimal and hyperreal3 probabilities.
Some think that this desire for regularity is a naïve mistake, but the arguments for it
are serious enough to warrant response. (See above references. Benci et al. 2018 reviews
some of the main arguments.)Williamson (2007), Parker (2012), Benci et al. (2018), and
others (Bernstein and Wattenberg 1969; Barrett 2010; Pruss 2013) have proposed
arguments against regularity based on the fact that, if regularity holds, certain perfectly
similar events cannot have the same probability. Howson (2017) and Benci et al. (2018)
have recently tried to refute those arguments. Here we will see how their refutations go
wrong.4 (Thus we will buttress the case against a general requirement of regularity.)
We will review the three symmetry arguments that Howson and Benci et al. criticize,
fleshing them out in certain respects. We will then consider and rebut Howson and
Benci et al.’s objections. Both Howson and Benci et al. focus on the details of formal
probability models, claiming that, once Williamson’s models are made explicit, his
error becomes apparent. Benci et al. claim that this extends as well to my (2012; 2013)
argument and their own proposal. But we will see that the technical errors alleged by
Howson and Benci et al. are not present in the original symmetry arguments.5 Those
arguments are based on very general principles, which we will make more explicit here,
1 I do not claim that all of these authors are supporters of regularity, only that the particular works cited at least
make suggestions in that direction.
2 For uncountable sample spaces, regularity and finite additivity already require infinitesimals, even if the
probabilities are not uniform. It is easy to show that, for any function P: Ω→ R+ where Ω is uncountable and
R+ is the set of positive real numbers, there are finitely many ω0, ω1,…, ωn ∈ Ω such that P(ω0) + P(ω1) +… +
P(ωn) > 1.
3 Hyperreal numbers are the elements of a field generated by real numbers and infinitesimals.
4 Easwaran (2014) defends Williamson against a different kind of objection, which we will not review here.
He also argues that the expressiveness promised by regular probabilities is already provided by the non-
numerical aspects of probability models, e.g., by inclusion relations between sets of outcomes.
5 As we will see, Benci et al. in a sense misunderstand their own proposed argument against regularity, for
they present it as a parallel to Williamson’s, and in misconstruing Williamson’s argument, they likewise
misdiagnose their own.
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and which, while they are not above doubt, are not beholden to the technical details of
any particular probability model. Finally, we will consider what stances a regularist
might take given that the objections fail.
2 The symmetry arguments
2.1 Williamson’s coin flip argument
Consider a fair coin that is tossed infinitely many times, at times t0 + n seconds for n =
0, 1, 2,…. Let H(1...) = H(1) & H(2) & H(3) &… be the event that every toss comes up
heads. Williamson argues that, even if we let probabilities take hyperreal values,
Prob(H(1…)) = 0.6 Since H(1…) is strictly possible, regularity fails. The crucial step
in Williamson’s argument is the claim that, if H(2…) = H(2) & H(3) &… is the event
that every toss after t0 comes up heads, then H(1…) and H(2…) are Bisomorphic
events^ and therefore should have the same probability.
Let H(1) be the event that the first toss comes up heads. Then
Prob H 1…ð Þð Þ ¼ Prob H 1ð Þ&H 2…ð Þð Þ:
Since the coin is fair and the tosses independent, we have,
Prob H 1ð Þð Þ ¼ 1=2;
Prob H 1ð Þ&H 2…ð Þð Þ ¼ Prob H 1ð Þð Þ  Prob H 2…ð Þð Þ;
and therefore,
Prob H 1…ð Þð Þ ¼ 1=2ÞProb H 2…ð Þð Þ:ð
But since H(1…) and H(2…) are isomorphic, Williamson claims,
Prob H 1…ð Þð Þ ¼ Prob H 2…ð Þð Þ;
and by substitution,
Prob H 1…ð Þð Þ ¼ 1=2ÞProb H 1…ð Þð Þ:ð
Since zero is the only solution to x ¼ 1=2Þx;ð
Prob H 1…ð Þð Þ ¼ 0:
Thus, the possible event H(1…) has probability zero, so regularity fails.7
6 Throughout we use ‘Prob’ for functions over physical events and ‘P’ for functions over sets that model
physical events.
7 Williamson introduces a third sequence of coin tosses in order to make his point more vivid, but we need not
consider it here.
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If this argument is sound, it applies equally whether the values of Prob are real or
hyperreal, since both number systems have the same first-order properties (those of a
real closed field), including all the properties used in the argument.
2.2 Physical isomorphism
Before we review the other arguments, let us flesh out Williamson’s a little. It clearly
relies on the following assumption:
Isomorphism Principle (IP): If two events are isomorphic (in the relevant
sense), they should have the same probability.
Williamson does not state IP explicitly, but what he says is suggestive:
But H(1...) and H(2...) are isomorphic events. More precisely, we can map the
constituent single-toss events of H(1...) one-one onto the constituent single-toss
events of H(2...) in a natural way that preserves the physical structure of the set-
up just by mapping each toss to its successor. H(1...) and H(2...) are events of
exactly the same qualitative type; they differ only in the inconsequential respect
that H(2...) starts one second after H(1...). Thus H(1...) and H(2...) should have
the same probability.
Hence, the fact that H(1…) and H(2…) have the same qualitative physical properties is,
for Williamson, the reason that they should have the same probability, and presumably
this inference is undergirded by a general principle like IP.
Why should one accept IP? An argument for a version of IP might run as follows:
(I) The laws of physics are space-time invariant.
(II) The chance of an event is determined by the physical laws and local qualitative
circumstances.
Therefore,
(IP') Two events that differ at most in where and when they hypothetically occur (and
perhaps in matters of bare identity but not in qualitative features) have the same
chance.
What I mean by (I) is just that the laws of physics are the same in every place at every
time, and they do not have any place- or time-dependent features. Whatever the laws
imply about the outcome of an experiment is the same no matter where and when that
experiment is conducted, other things being equal.8 This in itself does not imply IP',
8 Notice that (I) is weaker than Galilean or Lorentzian invariance, according to which the laws of physics are
the same across all inertial reference frames (in a Euclidean or Minkowskian space-time, respectively).
Premise (I) is just the claim that, given one such reference frame, the laws of physics are the same and apply
in the same way in each part of that one reference frame.
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because we might think that chances depend on something other than laws and
qualitative circumstances. But if (II) holds as well, then IP' follows (barring any creative
concept stretching).
The above argument applies directly only to physical chances or propensities. But
according to the Principal Principle (Lewis 1980, 1994), our credences should generally
track known chances, so we should also assign equal credence to such isomorphic
events.
Thus, the regularist is in an awkward dilemma: She must either deny the standard
and sensible principle that physical laws are space-time invariant, or deny that chances
are determined by local circumstances and laws. Neither is inconceivable, but either is a
weighty consequence, perhaps too weighty for the a priori arguments for regularity to
sustain.
One might take the view that this argument from space-time invariance is irrelevant,
since the stipulation that the individual tosses are independent and identically distrib-
uted (iid) already implies that H(1…) and H(2…) have the same Bstandard^ probabil-
ity.9 Under the Kolmogorov axioms (including countable additivity), Prob(H(1…)) =
Prob(H(2…)) =Πn ∈N ½= 0 (where N = {0, 1, 2,…}). However, to appeal to that result
would be begging the question, for it assumes the standard axioms and number system,
which regularists propose to revise. As Williamson’s argument shows, the equality
Prob(H(1…)) = Prob(H(2…)) fails under any alternative theory in which Prob(H(1…))
and Prob(H(2…)) are not strictly zero, since Prob(H(1…)) = ½ Prob(H(2…)). If one
wishes to argue directly from iid to the equality of Prob(H(1…)) and Prob(H(2…)), one
must assume either countable additivity, which regularists reject, or some other prob-
ability axiom that regularists would likely reject, e.g., that the probability of a conjunc-
tion of independent events is entirely determined by the probabilities of the conjuncts.
(This is close to what Hofweber (2014) calls conjunctive local determination and does
reject.) Such a strategy fails because it assumes too much, and since it fails, the appeal
to space-time invariance is relevant, if it succeeds. In any case, Williamson does not
argue directly from iid to Prob(H(1…)) = Prob(H(2…)), but appeals instead to the
qualitative physical properties of the events.
2.3 The circle argument
Williamson’s H(1…) and H(2…) are conjunctions of infinitely many coin flip out-
comes, in the sense that they require infinitely many toss outcomes all to occur. (I do
not wish to conflate the physical events H(1…) and H(2…) with conjunctive
sentences.) Another argument against regularity (Bernstein and Wattenberg 1969;
Barrett 2010; Parker 2012; Pruss 2013) involves disjunctive rather than conjunctive
events.
Construct a set of points on the unit circle as follows: Let p0 = (1, 0) in polar
coordinates, i.e., the point on the circle due-right of the centre. Let pn + 1 be the point
(1, n + 1) on the circle, one radian counter-clockwise from pn. Then let C0 = {p0, p1,
p2,…} = {(1, n): n ∈ N}, and let C1 = {p1, p2, p3,…} = {(1, n + 1): n ∈ N}. Notice that
C1 is a rotation of C0 by one radian, but is also a proper subset of C0, since C1 does not
contain p0.
9 This was argued by an anonymous reviewer.
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Now, let us choose a point on the circle randomly, say by throwing a dart at the
interior disk and constructing a radius through the centre of the dart shaft to a point on
the circle. What is the probability that this point lies in C0, and what is the probability
that it lies in C1? We can model this experiment with a probability space 〈S1, F, P〉,
where S1 is the unit circle and F an algebra on subsets of the circle that at least includes
C0, C1, and the singleton {p0}. The event EC that the point chosen by our experiment
lies in a given set C is modelled by that very set, i.e., Prob(EC) = P(C), where Prob is
the chance or credence of a physical occurrence and P is a function on sets that models
Prob. Thus, in our model, the set C0 represents the disjunctive event that the point
chosen by the dart throw is p0 or p1 or p2 or… .
Now, assume10 that P is rotationally symmetric. Then P(C0) = P(C1). But by finite
additivity, P(C0) = P({p0}) + P(C1). Hence, P({p0}) = 0, contradicting regularity. And
as with Williamson’s argument, this holds whether P takes hyperreal values or only real
values.
There are significant differences between this argument and Williamson’s. Firstly,
the circle experiment takes place in a finite region of space-time. It is just a single dart
throw at a finitely bounded disc (or in other versions, a single spin of a spinner or a
single quantum vacuum fluctuation). Thus it avoidsWilliamson’s unrealistic hypothesis
of an eternal sequence of tosses, in perfect rhythm, of a single, ever unchanging coin.
And if one is tempted to dodge Williamson’s argument by suggesting that space-time
invariance only applies to finite experiments and not to temporally infinite sequences of
events, such a dodge will not escape the circle argument.
Secondly, the circle argument does not rely on IP.11 It simply assumes that the
distribution is rotationally symmetric. However, this is only plausible if a dart throw or
some other experiment really can be performed with a perfectly symmetric distribu-
tion.12 Intuitively this ought to be possible, but to my knowledge there is no standard
physical principle to guarantee it in the way that space-time invariance (along with (II))
guarantees Williamson’s result. It does not help much to appeal to empirically con-
firmed laws that imply symmetry, for a committed regularist will claim that our
empirical laws need a slight revision, so that any probabilities that they imply are
adjusted by infinitesimal amounts to make them regular. Such subtle revisions are
generally compatible with observed frequencies. If we could construct an example
where the symmetry is due to some general principle rather than specific laws, the
regularists would not have such an easy retort. Parker 2012 attempts to construct such
an example involving quantum vacuum fluctuations, but the success of that example is
debatable.13 So an uncontroversially realistic and principled example is yet to be given
10 I do not claim that P must be rotationally symmetric. That would perhaps be question begging, but in any
case mistaken. Real dart throws are presumably not perfectly rotationally symmetric. I merely claim that it is
plausible that a rotationally symmetric distribution is possible. Committed regularists would have us believe
that a possible event must always have positive probability. This argument shows that such a claim has a rather
strong consequence, namely that fully rotationally symmetric continuous distributions are impossible.
11 Thus, not all of the symmetry arguments depend on space-time invariance, nor on the assumption that
chances are determined by laws and local circumstances.
12 In the circle argument stated here, we require rotational symmetry, but as shown in Parker 2012, there are
transformations of the circle example where translation or reflection symmetry is sufficient.
13 The example relies on the familiar picture of quantum vacuum fluctuations, in which virtual particles appear
and annihilate each other independently of observations. Some have argued in another context that this picture
is naïve (Boddy et al. 2016, 2017).
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but is far from being ruled out.14 Furthermore, Benci et al. hold that a probability theory
ought to be able to describe conceptually possible processes such as a fair lottery with
infinitely many tickets, and a dart throw with a perfectly symmetric distribution seems
at least as conceivable as a fair infinite lottery.15 So if we need a probability theory that
makes sense of the infinite lottery, as Benci et al. claim, then we arguably need one that
also accommodates invariant continuous distributions. But the circle argument shows
that such a theory cannot be regular.
2.4 The urn argument
Benci et al. (2018) introduce their own symmetry argument against regularity,
intending to refute it and thereby illustrate how the other ones go wrong. Their
argument is based on a fair infinite lottery, which is also the main motivating example
for their Non-Archimedean Probability (NAP) theory (2013, 2018; cf. Wenmackers
2011, Wenmackers and Horsten 2013). Their argument runs as follows:
Imagine an urn containing a countably infinite collection of tickets and a mech-
anism to implement a fair lottery on the tickets in the urn.
In situation (1), all tickets are in the urn and we denote the probability of winning
of each arbitrary single ticket in such a lottery as Prob(E1), leaving open the
possibility that this may be an infinitesimal.
In situation (2), one ticket is removed from the urn prior to the drawing of the
winning ticket. There is one competing ticket less, so the probability of winning
of each remaining ticket is Prob(E2) = 11−Prob E1ð Þ Prob(E1) (renormalization). Taken
in isolation, however, situation (2) looks exactly as before the removal of a ticket,
which is situation (1). Because of this isomorphism between situation (1) and
situation (2), we find that the probability of winning of each individual ticket is
equal to Prob(E2) = Prob(E1). … Even in a non-Archimedean [hyperreal] field,
these equalities can only hold simultaneously if Prob(E1) = Prob(E2) = 0. (Benci
et al. 2018)
Thus, according to this argument, E1 and E2 are possible but have probability zero, so
again regularity fails.
14 An anonymous reviewer suggests that none of our examples is physically realistic in any world whose laws
are even remotely like our world’s, and questions whether we can trust our intuitions about such examples. I
am not certain that the examples are so unrealistic. The dart throw and the related vacuum fluctuation of Parker
2012 only require that exact real values are selected from a continuum in a rotation- or translation-invariant
way. Quantum mechanics and indeed common sense suggest that we cannot measure such exact values, but
they do not imply that no exact values exist in the world. If a quantum vacuum fluctuation does not in fact
define any exact point in space and time, perhaps the exact center of some well defined lump in the
Schrödinger wave function does. We need not be able to measure an exact value in order to argue that it is,
or could be, determined by an invariant distribution and therefore contradicts regularity. Furthermore, if we
must imagine another world in which such a distribution is possible, we do not need any further intuition about
the physics of the process in order to conclude that it would violate regularity.
15 It is not obvious that a fair infinite lottery really is conceptually coherent, but Benci et al. take it to be so.
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The relevant Bisomorphism^ here is expressed in the stipulation that the new
situation (2) Blooks exactly as before^. The qualitative physical circumstances are the
same, or at least, the argument assumes that they are sufficiently alike that the
probability of choosing a given ticket should be the same in situations (1) and (2). If
we like, we can further stipulate that the remaining tickets in situation (2) shift so that
they have exactly the same states as those in situation (1). Then, as in the coin
argument, IP implies that the probabilities are the same.
2.5 A problem with the urn argument
Below we will turn to Benci et al.’s attempt to refute this argument, but let us note here
a problem with it that they do not discuss. The renormalization step, according to which
Prob(E2) = 11−Prob E1ð Þ Prob(E1), is not obviously correct. It assumes that removing a
ticket increases the probability of being selected for each remaining ticket, but this need
not be so. Removing a ticket changes the physical situation, at least in terms of bare
identities, and for the regularist there is no general rule that says this will change the
probability for any of the remaining tickets. Regularity does imply that removing a
ticket increases the probability that the chosen ticket will lie in the set of all other
tickets,16 but that does not imply that the probability has changed for any particular
ticket. It may be tempting to object, BHow can the probability increase for the set of
remaining tickets if it does not increase for any individual ticket?^, but that objection
presupposes countable additivity, or something like it, and proponents of infinitesimal
probabilities are already willing to sacrifice countable additivity (e.g., Benci et al. 2013,
2018).
One might think that the renormalization step is justified by conditionalization, as
Benci et al. later seem to suggest (p. 527). Let Ct be the event that a ticket t is chosen in
situation (1). Since the lottery is fair, Prob(Ct) = Prob(Cu) = Prob(E1) for any two tickets
t and u. Now suppose that ticket t is the one removed in situation (2). If we therefore
assume that Prob(E2) is equal to the conditional probability Prob(Cu | ~Ct), the ratio
formula for conditional probability gives us
Prob E2ð Þ ¼ Prob Cu&∼Ctð ÞProb ∼Ctð Þ ¼
Prob Cuð Þ
1−Prob Ctð Þ ¼
1
1−Prob E1ð Þ Prob E1ð Þ;
which is precisely the renormalization step. But this assumption that Prob(E2) =
Prob(Cu | ~Ct) is not obviously correct either. Conditional probability is commonly
used to model situations where we have obtained some information about an outcome,
such as the news that ticket t was not chosen. It also models cases where we adopt a
policy, e.g., if ticket t is chosen, put it back and repeat the experiment. But Benci et al.’s
case is neither of those. It is a case where a ticket has been physically removed, and
there is no general rule about how that will affect the probabilities for the remaining
tickets. So this application of conditional probability is unjustified.
16 Let T be the set of tickets and t the ticket removed. In situation (1), the probability that a particular ticket in
T \ {t} is selected is 1 – Prob(E1). Assuming regularity and that range(Prob) is contained in an ordered field, 1
– Prob(E1) < 1. In situation (2), the probability that a ticket in T \ {t} is selected is one, which is larger.
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Thus, the argument that regularity contradicts IP in this case is incomplete. However,
there could conceivably be situations, perhaps specific selection mechanisms, for which
the renormalization step or some similar move17 is correct. As with the circle argument,
such a situation is at least as conceivable as the fair infinite lottery itself. But regardless
of whether the urn argument can be salvaged, we will see that Benci et al.’s way of
countering it, as with the other arguments, is unsuccessful.
3 Objections and replies
3.1 Howson’s objection to Williamson
Howson claims that Williamson’s argument fails due to Ba confusion about what he
calls ‘isomorphic events’, assisted by an inadequate notation.^ The key point in
Howson’s argument is that, in an appropriate probability model for Williamson’s
example, H(1…) is a singleton set, containing just one element of the sample space,
while H(2…) is a pair, containing two elements of the sample space. Since a singleton
is not isomorphic to a pair, the events are not isomorphic and the argument fails.
Howson goes on to consider variations on Williamson’s argument, but this is the main
thrust of his objection.
To be precise, Howson specifies a probability space 〈2N, F, P〉, where the sample
space 2N is the set of all countable, one-way infinite sequences of zeros and ones, such
as 〈0, 1, 1, 0,… 〉; F is the algebra generated by the cylinder sets18 of 2N; and P is a
hyperreal-valued probability function defined on F. Williamson’s event H(1…) is then
modelled as the set {〈1, 1, 1,… 〉} and H(2…) as the set {〈1, 1, 1,… 〉, 〈0, 1, 1,… 〉}.
Note that the elements of an Bevent^ in probability theory represent disjunctive
alternatives. The set {〈1, 1, 1,… 〉, 〈0, 1, 1,… 〉}, for example, corresponds to the
disjunction ([H(1) & H(2) & H(3) &…] or [T(1) & H(2) & H(3) &…]), where T(1) is
the event that the first outcome is tails.
In general, two collections are said to be isomorphic if there is a bijection between
them that preserves all relevant structure. In algebra, for example, an isomorphism
preserves the algebraic relations between elements. But the sets {〈1, 1, 1,… 〉} and {〈1,
1, 1,… 〉, 〈0, 1, 1,… 〉} are not isomorphic in any sense, because there is not even a
bijection between them. Thus, according to Howson, Williamson’s events are not
isomorphic, so his argument is a non-starter.
3.2 Reply
What Williamson means by Bisomorphic events^ does not concern Bevents^ in the
jargon of probability theory, i.e., sets in the algebra of a probability space, but physical
17 Benci et al.’s renormalization step implies that the probabilities for all remaining tickets are affected equally,
i.e., multiplied by the same factor, but that is not needed. All that is needed to complete the urn argument is a
case where removing a ticket multiplies the probability for some particular ticket by a factor other than one.
18 The assumption that F is an algebra generated by cylinder sets is unnecessary here. If we are willing to
relinquish the possibility of translation invariance, as regularists must, we can define P on the entire power set
of 2N. But the particular domain of P does not bear on Howson’s objection so long as it includes {〈1, 1, 1,… 〉}
and {〈1, 1, 1,… 〉, 〈0, 1, 1,… 〉}.
European Journal for Philosophy of Science             (2019) 9:8 Page 9 of 21     8 
events, in the ordinary sense of things that happen, or things that might happen. As we
saw, Williamson is concerned with Bthe physical structure of the set-up^ and the
Bqualitative type^ of events. Moreover, he explains what he means by ‘isomorphic
events’ in terms of a structure-preserving map, not between subsets of the sample
space, but between Bthe constituent single-toss events^ H(1), H(2), H(3),… and H(2),
H(3), H(4),… that make up the events H(1…) and H(2…), respectively. While
Howson’s Bevents^ are effectively sets of disjuncts, Williamson’s Bisomorphism^
consists in a mapping between the conjunct events in H(1…) = H(1) & H(2) & H(3)
&… and H(2…) = H(2) & H(3) & H(4) &…. (I do not mean a mapping between the
symbols that serve as conjuncts in a sentence, but between the physical events that form
a larger event.) Furthermore, Williamson’s set-up guarantees a mapping of the conjunct
events that preserves qualitative physical properties and relations. He specifically
stipulates that the coin tosses in his sequences use the same fair coin and that the time
intervals between tosses are the same. We could go further and stipulate that all
qualitative properties of the tosses and sequences of tosses are exactly the same. Then
the events H(1…) and H(2…), construed not as subsets of a sample space but as
physical things that might happen, are indeed isomorphic in Williamson’s intended
sense. On his view, P({〈1, 1, 1,… 〉}) should equal P({〈1, 1, 1,… 〉, 〈0, 1, 1,… 〉}), not
because these two sets are isomorphic (which they clearly are not), but because the
physical events they model are qualitatively alike.19
Furthermore, there is an argument available that such isomorphism ought to imply
equal probability, namely the argument above from (I) and (II), and this argument
appeals only to the physical character of the events-in-the-ordinary-sense, not to the set-
theoretic structure of the sets that represent those events in a particular mathematical
model. Whatever model we might adopt, the physical argument still holds sway, so far
as its premises are plausible. So Howson’s set-theoretic objection misses the mark by a
wide margin.
To be fair, Williamson’s use of ‘isomorphism’ to express physical similarity shoul-
ders some blame for this misunderstanding. An isomorphism is normally a mapping
between sets, not between physical things-that-could-happen. Nonetheless, the
intended principle is clear: If the same experiment is conducted under the same
conditions at two different times, the probabilities of the outcomes should be the same.
Howson seems to have ignored this point in order to raise a technical issue that, in the
end, is not relevant.
19 An anonymous reviewer objects that H(1…) and H(2…) are not qualitatively identical because H(2…)
accommodates the possibility of a tail at the first flip and H(1…) does not. But as Williamson understands
these events, neither accommodates a tail at Bthe first flip^. Let us label the flips of H(1…) flip 1, flip 2, etc.
Then on Williamson’s conception, the Bfirst flip^ of H(2…) is flip 2, which must come up heads if H(2…)
occurs. The reviewer’s objection seems to require that H(2…) somehow incorporate the outcome of flip 1,
even though flip 1 is logically and probabilistically independent of the occurrence or non-occurrence of
H(2…). I think that Williamson, on the other hand, thinks of H(2…) as consisting in certain intrinsic structural
properties of the physical motion of a coin beginning at time t0 + 1, and not concerning in any way events
occurring before t0 + 1. Thus, H(2…) does not at all concern flip 1, which occurs at time t0. Likewise H(1…),
for Williamson, concerns the intrinsic structural properties of the motion of a coin from time t0 onward, and
nothing else. Williamson’s isomorphism claim is just the claim that these structural properties, those of the
coin’s motion from t0 onwards in H(1…) and those of its motion from t0 + 1 onwards in H(2…), are
qualitatively identical, and this is just true by stipulation.
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3.3 Events as sentences
Just as Williamson’s Bisomorphic events^ are not sets, they are not sentences either.20
They are physical things-that-might-happen. Thus, as noted above, when we speak of a
mapping between the conjuncts that constitute H(1…) and H(2…), this is not a
mapping between the symbolic conjuncts in a sentence, but between the physical coin
flip events that make up H(1…) and H(2…). Otherwise, one might be tempted to object
that H(1…) and H(2…) cannot be isomorphic because the first is just the infinite
sentence ‘H(1) & H(2) & H(3) & …’ while the second is an infinite sentence of the
disjunctive form
H 2… Dis :
‘H 1ð Þ&H 2ð Þ&H 3ð Þ&…or T 1ð Þ&H 2ð Þ&H 3ð Þ&…’:
To do so would miss two important points.
First, the fact that H(2…) can be viewed as a disjunction or disjunctive event does
not imply that it must be so understood. To say that H(2…) is really of the form
H(2…)Dis is like saying that the event of my winning the lottery today is really the
event of my winning the lottery today and having tuna for lunch or winning the lottery
today and not having tuna for lunch. The tuna is a red herring. It is irrelevant to my
winning the lottery, just as the first coin flip in H(1…) is irrelevant to the probability of
H(2…). Even if we were to understand H(1…) and H(2…) as sentences, there is no
reason that H(2…) must take the form H(2…)Dis, for, given Williamson’s specification
of the experiments, H(2…)Dis is logically equivalent to the simpler sentence ‘H(2) &
H(3) & H(4) & …’, which is structurally identical to the natural expression ‘H(1) &
H(2) & H(3) & …’ for H(1…).
But this brings us to the second point: Williamson is not concerned with a mapping
between linguistic objects, but between possible physical occurrences. It is not a
structural similarity between symbol strings that concerns him, but between physical
events that might occur in the world. If you like, these can be understood as mathe-
matical structures that might be instantiated by the behaviour of physical coins. They
are not instantiated by letters on paper or words from a mouth. Again, this is clear from
Williamson’s deliberate specification of the physical conditions and his references to
Bphysical structure^ and Bqualitative type^. The important thing for Williamson is that,
by stipulation, there is no intrinsic qualitative difference between the physical
events H(1…) and H(2…). They differ in their times of occurrence, their
spatiotemporal relations to each other and other events, and their bare haecceities if
you like, but those are precisely the kinds of things that, on the plausible principle IP,
make no difference to their probabilities.
3.4 Howson, the circle, and the urn
Howson 2017 is concerned only with the coin flip argument and a couple of variations
on it, not with the circle argument or the urn. However, it is worth noting that, while
Howson’s critique of the coin flip argument misses the point, it does not apply at all to
the other arguments. In the circle argument, the physical event that the point chosen by
20 This interpretation was suggested by an anonymous reviewer.
( )
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the dart throw lies in C0 is represented by the set C0 itself, and likewise for C1. Since C1
is just a rotation of C0, the two sets are set-theoretically, topologically, and metrically
isomorphic. But the circle argument does not rely on isomorphism per se. It uses the
fact that the two sets are rotations of each other, and assumes explicitly that the
probability distribution is rotationally symmetric. So Howson’s complaint about
Williamson’s argument, that the sets representing the events are not isomorphic, is
not true of the circle argument, nor relevant.
Nor is there a parallel of Howson’s critique for the urn argument. There the event of
drawing a given ticket is naturally represented by a singleton {n} ⊆N, in both situations
(1) and (2). Since any such singletons are isomorphic, the set-theoretic Bevents^ in the
models are indeed isomorphic and Howson’s objection does not apply. Of course, the
fact that two singletons are trivially isomorphic is no reason that they should be
assigned the same probability, but the urn argument does not rely on such an isomor-
phism between subsets of the sample space. Like the coin flip argument, it turns instead
on a qualitative similarity between physical situations. So here too, an objection along
Howson’s line is both false and irrelevant.
3.5 Benci et al.’s objection to the urn argument
Benci et al. point out that we can model the urn experiments in different ways, and
while we can equate the probability of E1 under one model with that of E2 under
another, we should not normally compare the probabilities given by two different
models or interpretations. B[C]hanging the sample space mid-game,^ as they put it,
Bis, in general, not allowed.^
Specifically, they suggest that we model situation (1) with the sample space
N and a hyperreal-valued function P on the subsets of N such that P({n}) = 1/α
for each n ∈ N, where α is the size of N in a non-standard measure
(Bnumerosity^).21 Benci et al. call this model A and write ProbA(E1) for the
probability that a given ticket is selected in situation (1) under model A.22
According to them, we can represent situation (2) in the same model using
conditional probability: The probability of selecting ticket number n given that
some other ticket i has been removed is given, they claim,23 by
ProbA E2ð Þ ¼ P nf gjN∖ if gð Þ ¼ 1= α−1ð Þ > 1=α ¼ ProbA E1ð Þ:
So, onmodel A, the probability that a given ticket is chosen varies from situation (1) to (2).
On the other hand, they point out, we can also represent situation (2) by
letting N represent the remaining tickets, after ticket i has been removed. In
21 Benci and others (e.g., Benci 1995; Benci and Di Nasso 2003; Di Nasso and Forti 2010; Benci, Bottazzi
and Di Nasso 2014) have developed an alternative theory of set size called numerosity theory, where the size
of an infinite set is not a Cantorian cardinal number but a hyper-integer. From this, one can derive a fair NAP
distribution by assigning to each element of a sample space the hyperreal probability equal to the reciprocal of
the numerosity of the sample space.
22 Remember, ProbA is not identical to P. ProbA applies to physical events, while P applies to subsets of N. If
we let lA be a Blabelling^ that maps physical events to sets in N, then ProbA can be understood as the
composition P○lA, i.e., ProbA(E) =P(lA(E)).
23 As noted above, this is not obviously correct, since in situation (2) we are not merely conditionalizing but
considering an altered set-up, and we cannot assume countable additivity here.
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that case, a natural model B gives the probability ProbB(E2) = 1/α of choosing
one of the remaining tickets in situation (2). Thus, ProbA(E1) is equal to
ProbB(E2), but, according to Benci et al., A and B are two different models,
and the fact that two events have the same probability under two different
models does not imply that they must have the same probability in a single
model.
Let us clarify something here: Technically, A and B are not different models. They
are two names for the same mathematical model, with the same sample space N
and the same assignments of values to subsets of N (or at least, Benci et al. do
not indicate any difference between the assignments). However, this model is
associated with two different interpretations or Blabellings^, different ways of
associating physical events with sets in the model. For Bmodel A^, each natural
number corresponds to one of the original tickets, while for Bmodel B^, each
natural number corresponds to one of the remaining tickets, after one has been
removed. So the real difference is not between two models but between two
labellings. However, Benci et al.’s point is no less valid; the fact that two
events have the same probability under different labellings does not imply that
they must have the same probability under a single labelling.
Thus, according to Benci et al., the urn argument commits an oversight. We thought
we had shown simply that Prob(E1) = Prob(E2), when actually we had only shown that
ProbA(E1) = ProbB(E2), for two different labellings A and B, and this does not support
the conclusion that regularity fails.
3.6 Reply
Benci et al. are quite right: The fact that two events have the same probability
under two different labellings does not imply that they simply have the same
probability. However, there is a further reason to think that, under any accurate
model, the probability of drawing a given ticket in situations (1) and (2) should
be the same. The reason is that the qualitative physical situation is exactly the
same in both cases, and by our principle IP, the same event under the same
qualitative circumstances should have the same probability. Benci et al. even
make such an argument themselves when they write that Bsituation (2) looks
exactly as before the removal of a ticket,…. Because of this isomorphism
between situation (1) and situation (2), we find that the probability of winning
of each individual ticket is equal^ (2018, my emphasis). Yet, when they come
to their reply, they ignore the premise that Bisomorphic^ events should have the
same probability and claim instead that the argument trades on a conflation of
two different labellings. In fact, their own presentation of the argument involves
no such conflation; it is clearly founded on IP, and as noted, there is an
argument for IP from more basic principles. Given IP, any model in which
the probability of drawing a given ticket (other than the one removed) varies
from situation (1) to situation (2) is an inaccurate model. Benci et al. have
tried to show that one can construct such a model, where ProbA(E2) > ProbA(E1),
but that does nothing to refute the argument from IP that any such model is
inaccurate.
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3.7 Benci et al.’s objection to the coin flip argument
Following the same line as their objection to the urn argument, Benci et al. claim that
Williamson conflates two different probability models for his coin flip experiments.
They again refer to Btwo models^ A and B, which are actually the same model with two
different labellings. In model A, they say, the sample space (or more accurately the
labelling) Breflects that the count of events starts at the first toss of H(1…)^, while in
model B the same sample space (with a different labelling) is used Bto reflect that the
count of events starts at the first toss of H(2…).^
Let us make this more explicit. Define labellings lA and lB so that
lA H 1…ð Þð Þ ¼⟨1; 1; 1;…⟩f g;
lA H 2…ð Þð Þ ¼⟨0; 1; 1;…⟩;⟨1; 1; 1;…⟩f g;
lB H 2…ð Þð Þ ¼⟨1; 1; 1;…⟩f g:
Thus, under lA, H(1…) and H(2…) are represented by the same sets as in Howson’s
objection, while under lB, H(2…) is represented by {〈1, 1, 1,… 〉} and H(1…) has no
representation at all. Now let P: 2N→ [0, 1]* where [0, 1]* is a hyperreal unit interval,
and for any physical event in the domain of lX, for X = A, B, let ProbX(E) = P(lX(E)).
Hence,
ProbA H 1…ð Þð Þ ¼ P lA H 1…ð Þð Þ ¼ P ⟨1; 1; 1;…⟩f gð Þ;ð
ProbA H 2…ð Þð Þ ¼ P ⟨0; 1; 1;…⟩;⟨1; 1; 1;…⟩f gð Þ; and
ProbB H 2…ð Þð Þ ¼ P ⟨1; 1; 1;…⟩f gð Þ ¼ ProbA H 1…ð Þð Þ:
Now Benci et al. write,
Williamson exploits the intuition that ProbA(H(1…)) = ProbB(H(2…)).
But he glosses this as Prob(H(1…)) = Prob(H(2…)), thus turning the
probabilities involved into evaluations within the same model. On the
other hand, Williamson convincingly argues that Prob(H(1…)) = ½
Prob(H(2…)). … The two glosses indeed contradict each other unless
Prob(H(1…)) = Prob(H(2…)) = 0. But the contradiction can only be
obtained when the difference between the sample spaces is glossed over.
(2018, 529–530)
In other words, Williamson’s claim that H(1…) and H(2…) should have the same
probability is founded on a conflation of ProbA and ProbB.
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3.8 Reply
There is no textual evidence that Williamson conflates two different models or
labellings. In fact, there is clear evidence to the contrary: Williamson tells us
why H(1…) and H(2…) should have the same probability. It is because they
are (physically) isomorphic. That argument does not depend on the particular
model or labelling employed. Williamson’s point is that, in any accurate model
of his proposed experiment, H(1…) and H(2…) will have the same probability.
Thus he would insist, not that ProbA(H(1…)) = ProbB(H(2…)), but that
ProbA(H(1…)) should equal ProbA(H(2…)), or else A is just not a good model.
There is no reason to suppose that this is founded on any slide or conflation. It
is clearly founded on the principle that physically isomorphic events should
have the same probability, and again, there is a simple argument available for
that principle. Thus, contrary to Benci et al.’s claim in the above passage, the
contradiction can indeed be obtained in a single model, with a single sample
space, if one only takes seriously Williamson’s premise that physically isomor-
phic events have the same probability.
Later (p. 546), Benci et al. acknowledge the physical basis of Williamson’s
argument, writing, BWe know, one might say, that the laws of physics are time-
translation invariant.^ Yet they then complain that Bit is still not easy to see
why the NAP treatment of Williamson’s scenario has to violate time-translation
invariance.^ Well, the reasons are straightforward:
1. Any regular probability model that assigns probabilities to H(1…) and H(2…)
must assign a larger probability to H(2…).
2. H(2…) is a time translation of H(1…).24
3. Therefore, any regular probability model for H(1…) and H(2…) violates time
translation invariance.
4. All NAP models are regular.
5. Therefore, any NAP model for H(1…) and H(2…) violates time translation
invariance. QED.
It is also true that, given a NAP model that assigns a probability to H(1…),
one could consider a different NAP model that assigns the same probability to
H(2…), but that is irrelevant. The first model on its own must violate time
invariance because it assigns a larger probability to H(2…) than H(1…), and
the second model must also violate time invariance because it assigns a larger
probability to H(3…) (the event that each flip after the second comes up heads)
than to H(2…). Moreover, if we want to understand the relation between the
probabilities of H(1…) and H(2…), we need to represent them together in one
model. If that model is regular, it cannot be time invariant.
24 An anonymous reviewer objects that H(2…) is not a time translation of H(1…) because the former
accommodates the possibility of a tail at the first flip and the latter does not. But as argued in note 19,
H(2…) can be understood, as Williamson seems to understand it, as a physical event that occurs entirely after
the first flip of H(1…) and does not involve that first flip at all.
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3.9 Benci et al.’s objection to the circle argument
Benci et al. rehearse a version of the circle example, referring to Parker 2013 and
others.25 They then remark, BIt will be clear to the reader by now that our diagnosis of
the argument from rotational symmetry against infinitesimal probabilities is structurally
identical to our diagnosis of Williamson’s argument. Hence, we do not describe it in
detail here.^
So let us describe it in detail. The diagnosis of Williamson’s argument was
that he conflates two different probability models, or more precisely, two
different labellings. Presumably, then, Benci et al. would claim that the circle
argument tacitly appeals to two different labellings lA and lB, such that
ProbA(C0) = P(lA(C0)) = P(lB(C1)) = ProbB(C1). Then they will say (if the diagno-
sis is indeed structurally identical to that of Williamson’s argument) that the
circle argument tacitly switches labellings mid-game, and if we do not conflate
ProbA with ProbB, there is no reason to suppose that ProbX(C0) = ProbX(C1) on
any one labelling lX.
3.10 Reply
In reality, the circle argument stated here explicitly assumes that there is a
single finitely additive (and possibly hyperreal) probability function P that
assigns values to both C0 and C1 and which is rotationally symmetric.
26 It
follows trivially that P(C0) = P(C1), because C1 is a rotation of C0. And, as
noted, the event EC that the point determined by a dart throw lies in a set C is
represented by that very set C. So there is only one labelling in play, namely
l(EC) = C for each subset C of the circle. The argument involves no conflation
of models or labellings. It only assumes that the distribution is rotationally
symmetric, and hence, that a rotationally symmetric continuous distribution is
possible. In the dart throwing implementation, this amounts to assuming that it
is possible to throw a dart, or construct a device to throw a dart, in such a way
as to yield a rotationally symmetric distribution. A dedicated regularist would
have to deny that such a strictly symmetric distribution is possible. But that is
a strong claim to make on the back of intuition, conceptual analysis, or
theoretical virtues. It is at least conceptually possible that some perfectly
symmetric set-up could produce a perfectly symmetric distribution. Benci
et al. do not deny this; they only hint that the argument involves a conflation
of two different models, and that is simply not the case.
25 The example in Parker 2013 is suggestive but does not concern probability. Rather it is used to argue that
BEuclidean^ theories of cardinality such as numerosity (see note 21) also violate rotation and translation
invariance, and consequently lack certain theoretical virtues. Parker 2012 gives the parallel argument against
regular probabilities.
26 Parker 2012 argues contrapositively from the assumption of regularity to the failure of rotation invariance,
but again it is explicitly a failure of rotation invariance for a single probability function. Bernstein and
Wattenberg 1969, Barrett 2010, and Pruss 2013 also discuss invariance for a single probability function. Of
course, Benci et al. could claim that these are all careless glosses, but there is no need for such accusations if
the arguments are taken at face value.
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4 Next moves
If, as I have argued, Howson and Benci et al.’s replies fail to refute these three
arguments, what more could they say in defense of regular and hyperreal probabilities?
Howson might respond by pointing to a merely instrumental role for hyperreal
probabilities. He writes,
[T]he object there is not so much, or at all, to regard hyperreal probabilities as on
the same footing as real-valued ones but to use the nonstandard universe simply
as an aid to the standard theory by translating standard problems into nonstandard
ones by means of the Transfer Principle, where they are often more tractable….
(2017)
Consequently, he might say, proponents of hyperreal probabilities will not be troubled
by arguments from physical principles. However, this is not how philosophers typically
use hyperreal probabilities. Hofweber (2014), defends hyperreal probabilities on con-
ceptual grounds. His Minimal Constraint on probability measures is
(MC) If the chance of p is 0, then not p. If the chance of p is 1, then p.
BI can’t help but to judge,^ he writes, Bthat (MC) is a conceptual truth about
chance, given that 0 is the lowest and 1 the highest possible measure of
chance. … It is a conceptual truth about chance that an event which happens
has a better chance of happening than an event which is conceptually
incoherent.^ Lewis expresses a similar sentiment: BZero chance is no chance,
and nothing with zero chance ever happens^ (1983, 176). Lewis and Hofweber
do not use infinitesimals to facilitate calculations, they just think that infinites-
imals correctly represent the structure of chances in the real world (whether as
a merely conceptual truth or a more realist metaphysical claim). Benci et al., on
the other hand, champion infinitesimal probabilities in order to make better
sense of what they consider to be conceptually possible scenarios, such as
infinite lotteries. NAP models, they argue, have theoretical virtues over the
De Finetti (1974) approach to infinite lotteries (which is essentially just to drop
countable additivity) and even over the standard treatment of continuous sample
spaces. To an extent, the possibility of calculation is one of their concerns, for
it is one of the stated motivations for their generalized continuity axiom. But
their primary motivation is not to simplify calculations. It is to find enlighten-
ing models, models that can give us a better theoretical handle on problematic
hypothetical processes. So Howson’s instrumentalist view of hyperreal proba-
bilities is not in line with the philosophical literature.27
Still, Benci et al. seem inclined to a milder pragmatism. Some of their discussion
suggests a general antirealism about probability models. B[T]here is no reason to
assume,^ they write, Bthat there is a unique best way to model certain infinite
probabilistic situations…^ Thus they might counter the arguments against regularity
by claiming that, even if the space-time invariance of probabilities is sometimes
27 Bartha and Hitchcock (1999) is an explicitly instrumentalist exception.
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mandated by plausible or useful principles, the best models over all might involve an
infinitesimal deviation from such invariance. Or they might just argue that it is useful to
apply various models to a given process, if only to better understand the space of
possible models and their virtues and limitations.
Yet, as Benci et al. themselves point out, it could be argued that, BThere is such a
thing as physical chance. And it is a legitimate task of our mathematical models to track
this property.^ Plausibly, the chances for a given experiment have a definite structure.
The outcomes in any sequence of die rolls or coin flips exhibit a distinctive and robust
pattern, largely independent of the detailed circumstances or the observer’s concep-
tions. It is one of the main goals of probability theory to accurately characterize and
explain such patterns. Benci et al. respond to such a realist viewpoint as follows:
But our models can only track physical chance in a mediated way. In order to
describe a physical system and its behaviour, our probabilistic models have to
select a sample space and label the point events (that is, establish a connection
between reality and point events in the model). For finite sample spaces, the
labelling does not matter; but for infinite sample spaces, different labellings can
result in different probability assignments. All this induces a degree of relativity
in probability values of events. (2018, 542)
Thus, according to Benci et al., any probability model with an infinite sample space
will involve some arbitrariness, whether it is a standard Kolmogorovian model or a
regular one. Their main concern in this passage is arbitrariness related to the choice of
labelling and, for NAP models, the choice of an ultrafilter, but it suggests they might
take a similarly noncommittal stance toward the choice between regular and space-time
invariant models.
The problem with such a stance is that it appears incompatible with the goal of
accurately modelling physical chances. For the kinds of experiments discussed here, a
model cannot be both regular and space-time invariant. If our goal is to characterize the
true structure of the chances in such experiments, we should take into account whether
the chances are truly space-time invariant or regular (or neither). This leaves us little
freedom to choose; either regular models are accurate or they are not, and the examples
discussed here give us some reason to believe that, at least in those cases, they are not.
This brings us to another possible position, namely that of a moderate, pluralistic
regularist who holds that, in cases where there is a strong argument from IP against
regularity, the latter might fail, but otherwise it should hold. However, this position is
awkward, especially for Benci et al. Their main application of NAP is to the de Finetti
lottery with an infinite number of tickets, but their own urn argument suggests that such
a lottery can bring regularity into conflict with IP or other plausible symmetry
assumptions (provided there are cases where something like their renormalization step
applies). To hold this pluralistic regularist position would mean holding that infinite
lotteries are not regular when the specific conditions that justify such a renormalization
step hold, but they are generally regular otherwise. If we admit that regularity is false
for certain selection mechanisms, why should we expect it to hold for others?
We can make this point more concrete. Suppose we have a lottery machine for
which the renormalization step is valid, and suppose the moderate regularist admits that
regularity fails for this lottery machine. Now let us add to this machine a component
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that detects which tickets are present in the urn. If one of the original tickets is removed,
it applies a different selection mechanism for which no such renormalization formula
applies. For this composite lottery machine, we cannot make Benci et al.’s urn
argument. Will the moderate regularist then claim that regularity does hold for the
composite machine? Surely, if the composite machine applies the same mechanism as
the original machine when all the original tickets are present, then in that case it
produces the same distribution as the original machine. Thus, such opportunistic
regularism is generally untenable. Similarly, if we accept that there are realizations of
the circle example where the distribution is fully rotation-symmetric and regularity
fails, we should not expect that regularity holds whenever the distribution is not
perfectly symmetric.
What this illustrates is that, if indeed we are concerned with accurately modelling the
structure of objective chances, then the question of regularity turns not on theoretical
virtues, but on the details of the probabilistic processes under study. If indeed there are
cases where regularity does not hold, then (1) there is no sound and fully general
argument for regularity, and (2) regularity is not needed to render such experiments
conceptually coherent. At most, regular models boast certain theoretical virtues while
lacking others, namely those of permitting invariance under various transformations.
But if there are any facts about the structure of chances, the model should reflect those
facts first, and desirable theoretical virtues only as accuracy permits. Of course, it may
be difficult to determine what the most accurate model is in any particular case, but if
we have good reason to believe that chances are not regular in certain cases, we can
reasonably hypothesize that they are not regular in similar cases either.
5 Conclusion
We have reviewed three arguments that certain hypothetical experiments exhibit non-
regular probabilities. If these arguments succeed, then regularity does not generally
hold, and there is little reason to believe that it typically holds for other experiments,
nor that we should demand it in our credences. Howson and Benci et al. have attempted
to refute those arguments, but their refutations fail. Howson points out that
Williamson’s events are not in fact isomorphic, because one is a singleton while the
other is a pair, but this misses the point. Howson is speaking of the abstract Bevents^ of
mathematical probability theory, which are sets, while Williamson is concerned with
events in the ordinary sense of things that could happen. WhenWilliamson says that his
two coin flip sequences are isomorphic, he does not mean that they are subsets of a
sample space that have a one-to-one correspondence, he means that they have all of the
same physical qualitative properties, and this is true by hypothesis. Benci et al. claim
that I, Williamson, and they themselves found their arguments on a conflation of
different probability models. The symmetries betweenWilliamson’s coin flip sequences
imply that they can be assigned the same probability in different models, but not that
they must have the same probability in a single model, and likewise for my point sets
and their own lottery draws. But none of these arguments is in fact based on such a
conflation of models. Williamson’s and Benci et al.’s are both founded on the principle
that qualitatively identical events in qualitatively identical circumstances should have
the same probability, and mine is based on the plausibility of a perfectly symmetric
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continuous distribution. All of us claim, not that our parallel events can be given the
same probability in different models, but that the parallel events will have the same
probability in any one model, if that model is accurate. This is no mere slide.
The principle underlying the coin and urn arguments, that Bisomorphic^ events have
the same probability, is not above dispute, but we have provided here a simple
argument from more fundamental hypotheses. If (I) the laws of nature are space-time
invariant, and (II) chances are determined by local qualitative circumstances and natural
laws, it follows that qualitatively identical events have the same chance, and should
also be assigned the same credence insofar as rational credences track chance. One who
insists on regularity must therefore deny either the space-time invariance of laws or the
grounding of chance in laws and qualitative circumstances.
This leaves the regularist several options, including at least the following: One may
take a more or less instrumentalist view that is more concerned with the theoretical
virtues of regular probabilities than with accurately modelling chances. One may hold
that regularity fails in the cases discussed but is still plausible in other cases, though we
have seen that this is an uncomfortable position to hold. Or, one might simply deny IP,
as well as the very possibility of a symmetric continuous distribution. Hofweber (2014),
at least, prefers the latter move, and denies premise (II), that chances are determined by
laws and local circumstances. But if regularity requires that so-called objective chance
is in reality such a contextual matter, or that the laws of physics are not in fact space-
time invariant, then the arguments for regularity should be regarded very sceptically.
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